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THE "FAIR AND EQUITABLE
TREATMENT" STANDARD PURSUANT TO
THE INVESTMENT PROVISIONS OF THE
U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS WITH
PERU, COLOMBIA AND PANAMA
Andrew P. Tuck*
RECENTLY, foreign investors have brought actions against the
United States pursuant to the North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAF[A") Chapter 11 investor-state dispute mech-
anism, causing the United States to become the first capital-exporting
state to break with investors' interests.' The United States is evaluating
foreign investment law both offensively and defensively. Indeed, the
United States has tried to substantially limit Chapter 11 investment pro-
tection provisions to protect the country from NAIFTA investment claims.
This U.S. policy change is reflected in the investment provisions of the
U.S. Free Trade Agreements ("FTFAs") with Peru, Colombia and
Panama .2
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1. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex. ch. 11, Dec. 17, 1992,
32 I.L.M. 639 [hereinafter NAFTA]; see also North American Free Trade Agree-
ment, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 3301-3473 (2008).
2. In 2006, the United States signed FTAs with both Peru and Colombia. In 2007, the
United States signed an FTA with Panama. Each agreement is based on the text
of NAFTA and the implementation experience of the United States, subject to the
negotiating objectives in the President's 2002 Trade Promotion Authority as modi-
fied by the 2007 Bipartisan Trade Deal. See Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Peru,
Apr. 12, 2006, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreemen ts/peru-tpafi nal -text (last visited Sept. 14, 2009);
see also Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Colom., Nov. 22, 2006, Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agree-
ments/colombia-ftalfinal-text (last visited Sept. 14, 2009); Free Trade Agreement,
U.S.-Pan., June 28, 2007, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, http://www.ustr.
gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/panama-tpa/final-text (last visited
Sept. 14, 2009) [hereinafter Peru, Colombia, and Panama FTAs]. The Peru FTA
was ratified and entered into force on February 1, 2009. Colombia's Congress ap-
proved the free-trade agreement and a protocol of amendment in 2007. Colom-
bia's Constitutional Court completed its review in July 2008, and concluded that
the Agreement conforms to Colombia's Constitution. The U.S. Congress has not
yet ratified the Agreement. President Obdma taskcd thc Office of thc U.S. Tradc
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An examination of how NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitral tribunals have ap-
plied and interpreted the precise scope of the concept of "fair and equita-
ble treatment" and the requirements of minimum standards of
international law and "customary international law" pursuant to the in-
vestment provisions of NAFTA in S.D. Myers v. Canada,3 Pope & Talbot
v. Canada,4 Mondev v. United States,5 and Glamis Gold v. United States,6
is particularly helpful in understanding the U.S. struggle to find a balance
between providing robust foreign investment protections based on inter-
national law and simultaneously avoid investment treaty disputes. This
approach to "fair and equitable treatment" will not focus on the precise
language of NAFTA Chapter 11 but rather on what "customary interna-
tional law" really means.
An analysis of NAFFA Chapter 11 jurisprudence may also shed light
on what the customary international law standard of treatment found in
the Peru, Colombia and Panama FTrAs requires of a state party vis-A-vis
investors of another state party. If one understands how NAFTFA has
been applied and interpreted, subsequent U.S. ETAs can usually be un-
derstood as well.
The concerns of the NAFTA parties over Pope & Talbot, S.D. Myers,
and other assumed deviations from the customary international law stan-
dard prompted the first and to date only binding "interpretation" of
NATTA Chapter 11, which applies customary international law to limit
the scope of "fair and equitable treatment" under international law. 7 Ar-
guably, however, the scope of "fair and equitable treatment" should be
broader than the states' interpretation. For example, Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice states that custom is only one
of four sources of international law. 8 Nevertheless, Chapter 10 of the
U.S. IFTAs with Peru, Colombia, and Panama explicitly incorporate the
NAFTFA parties' FTC Interpretation ensuring the applicability of "cus-
tomary international law," rather than "international law."
Congress' decision in the Trade Act of 2002 also reflected Congress'
fear that the United States was about to lose one or more NAFTA dis-
Representative with seeking a path to address outstanding issues surrounding the
Colombia FTA. During a visit from Colombian President Alvaro Uribe in June
2009, however, Obama said he did not have a "strict timetable" to the agreement,
presumably as controversy over the safety of Colombian labor leaders continue.
See Press Release, The White House, Remarks by Obama and President Uribe of
Colombia in Joint Press Availability (June 29, 2009), available at http://www.white
house.gov/the-press-office/Remarks-by-Obama-and-President-Uribe-of-Colom-
bia-in-Joint-Press-Avai lability. Panama approved the free-trade agreement on
July 11, 2007. The U.S. Congress has not yet ratified the agreement.
3. See generally S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, 40 l.L.M. 1408 (2001).
4. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, 41 I.L.M. 1347 (2002).
5. Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, 42 I.L.M. 85 (2003).
6. Glamnis Gold Ltd. v. United States, NAFTFA Arb. Trib. (2009), available at http:I/
naftaclaims.comlDisputesfUSAlGlamis-USA-Award.pdf.
7. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38. June 26. 1945, available at
h ttp://www. icJ-cij.orgldocu men ts/i ndex. ph p?pI =4& p2=2&p3=0 .
8. Id.
9. See Peru, Colombia, and Panama FrAs, supra note 2, at ch. 10.
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putes. Indeed, two Chapter 11 actions against the United States,
Methanex v. United States10 and Loewen v. United States," were particu-
larly troublesome and ultimately led to the negotiating objectives for fu-
ture investment provisions in international trade agreements and bilateral
investment treaties as embodied in the 2002 U.S. "Trade Promotion
Authority."'12
Another example of the United States' defensive posture regarding
foreign investment law is found in the 2007 Bipartisan Trade Deal, the so-
called compromise between the U.S. Trade Representative's Office and
the Democratic Party leadership. In this deal, the Trade Representative
and the Democratic Party agreed that there would be language in the
preamble of the newer FIFA investment chapters, including those found
in the Peru, Colombia, and Panama FTAs stating "that foreign investors
in the United States will not be accorded greater substantive rights with
respect to investment protections than United States investors in the
United States" under the U.S. Constitution. 13
Finally, the national treatment language found in the 2002 U.S. Trade
Promotion Authority, and the preamble of the U.S. FTAs with Peru, Co-
lombia and Panama is reminiscent of the Calvo Doctrine, a troubling de-
velopment that further limits the scope of foreign investment
protections. 14
1. THE ORIGINS OF NAFTA CHAPTER 11
The investment provisions of NAFTA Chapter 11 are not completely
innovative, and, in fact, the entire chapter is based in large part on the
U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty ("BIT") and earlier treaties that
required prompt, adequate, and effective compensation for expropriation
as a response to economic nationalists' assertions that expropriated inves-
tors were entitled to no more than the same treatment that states afford
their nationals.' 5 Indeed, the U.S. Model BIT obligates a host state, at
the request of the investor, to submit investment disputes to binding
10. Methanex Corp. v. United States, 44 I.L.M. 811 (200)3).
11. Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, 42 I.L.M. 811 (2003).
12. Trade Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. § 3801 (2002). The negotiating objectives directed
the U.S. Trade Representative's Office to, inter alia; ensure that foreign investors
in the United States are not accorded greater substantive rights with respect to
investment protections than U.S. investors in the United States and to establish
standards for expropriation and compensation for expropriation, consistent with
U.S. legal principles and practice.
13. See Trade Facts: Final Bipartisan Trade Deal on Investment, OFICE OF U.S. TRADE
REPRE~SENTATIVE, may 11, 2007, http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/
factsheets/2007/asset-upload-filel27-1.l131 9.pdf.
14. See R. Doak Bishop & James E. Etri, International Commercial Arbitration in
South America, http://www.kslaw.com/library/pdf/bishop3.pdf (last visited June 8,
2010).
15. 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, Annex A (2004), available at http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/1 17601.pdf.
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third-party arbitration. 16
Specific aspects of NAFTFA investor-state arbitration are, nonetheless,
dissimilar to the American Model BIT. Most importantly, all of the ear-
lier agreements with mandatory investor-state arbitration were with de-
veloping, capital importing nations, rather than a developed, capital
exporting (as well as importing) nation like Canada. Indeed, the capital
exchange between the United States and Canada is substantial, with more
than $ 610 billion of trade per year between the two nations.17 The
United States is also Canada's largest investor, with $289 billion being
invested a year, while Canada's $159 billion trade per year with the
United States ranks fifth.18 Canada's well-developed legal systems with
independent judiciaries provide a high level of protection for both foreign
and domestic investors against arbitrary actions by the governments. 19
Surprisingly, at least to the NAFTA negotiators, actions by U.S. investors
against Canada or Canadian investors against the United States account
for the majority of NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes. This litigation experi-
ence between Canada and the United States is reflected in the changes to
the investment provisions of subsequent BITs and U.S. ETFAs, including
the FTAs with Peru, Colombia, and Panama, despite the fact that virtu-
ally none of the BITs or FTFAs are with developed countries whose na-
tionals are likely to be filing investment dispute claims against the United
States.20
II. NAVIA'S FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT
STANDARD FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT
NAFTA Chapter 11, entitled "Investment," serves two purposes. First,
it provides a set of mandatory substantive provisions, which include, inter
alia, most-favored-nation treatment, performance requirements, national-
ity of senior management, and mechanisms for financial transfers. 21 Sec-
ond, NAFTA Chapter 11 provides for binding arbitration of disputes
between foreign investors and their host governments under the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") arbi-
tration rules, the World Bank's International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes ("ICSID") Convention, or the ICSLDs "Additional
Facility Rules."122
If a NAFTrA arbitral tribunal concludes that a host government has
violated any of its Chapter 11 obligations, the tribunal may require that
16. Id. art. 20. For additional information on Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) see
K. Scott Gudgeon, United States Bilateral Investment Treaties: Comments on Their
Origin, Purposes, and General Treatment Standards, 4 IN-r'i- TAX & Bus. L. 105,
112-129 (1986).





21. See NAFTA, supra note 1.
22. Id. art. 1120.
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government pay compensation to the foreign-investor complainant.23 An
investor, moreover, may seek enforcement of an arbitration award under
the JCSID or the New York or InterAmerican Conventions. 24 Although
NAFTA Chapter 11 contains a comprehensive set of mandatory substan-
tive provisions, "fair and equitable treatment" is one of Chapter 11's
most important and controversial provisions. As discussed infra, despite
a series of arbitral tribunal decisions the scope of "fair and equitable
treatment" has not yet been fully determined.
NAFTA Article 1105 states that "[elach Party shall accord to invest-
ments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with interna-
tional law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and
security."125 Since the "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection
and security" standards are connected with "international law," foreign
investors asserting that the state had denied them fair and equitable treat-
ment must demonstrate that the denial was a violation of international
law. 26
Unfortunately, there was little guidance regarding the definition of
"fair and equitable treatment." NAFTA itself never defines the precise
meaning of "fair and equitable treatment," and the U.S. Statement of
Administrative Action, which accompanied NAFTA to Congress in 1993,
never mentions Article 1105.27 But the Canadian Statement on Imple-
mentation of NAFTA explained that Article 1105(1) "provides for a min-
imum absolute standard of treatment, based on long-standing principles
of customary international law."128
The difference between "international law" and "customary interna-
tional law" has been a primary source of contention in investor-state arbi-
tration proceedings. Under Article 1105, the term "international law"
suggests a broader scope than "customary international law."129 Indeed,
one possible interpretation of the "fair and equitable treatment" lan-
guage is the following: Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice defines international law to include: (a) international conven-
tions, (b) international custom, (c) "the general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized nations," and (d) "judicial decisions and the teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations."130 In other
words, customary international law is merely a subset of international
23. Id. art. 1135.
24. Id. art. 1136(6).
25. Id. art. 1105(l).
26. See Daniel M. Price & P. Bryan Christy, An Overview of the NAFTA Investment
Chapter: Substantive Rules and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 27 IN'r'L L. 727,
729 (1993).
27. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Statement of Ad-
ministrative Action, available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/PaperslUS /20State-
ment%2Oof%20Administrative%20Action.pdf.
28. North American Free Trade Agreement: Canadian Statement on Implementation,
Canada Gazette Part 1 (Jan. 1, 2004), available at http://www.international.gc.cal
trade-agreemen ts-accords-commerciauxlasse ts/pdfs[Nl II JAN I 994.pdf.
29. See id.
30. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38.
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law. Customary international law is "created and sustained by the con-
stant and uniform practice of States," and indicates "the mutual convic-
tion that the recurrence is the result of a compulsory rule" or opinio
'uris. 31
Still, the significance of Article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice is unclear. Some commentators have argued that inter-
national conventions and custom are the only legitimate sources of inter-
national law, i.e., "judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations," are only opinion evidence of
international law standards and do not constitute state practice; and "the
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" aren't binding
norms, but rather provide interpretive guidance.32 But to argue that cus-
tom operates independently of treaties, including more than 2,000 bilat-
eral investment treaties, many treaties of friendship and commerce, and
several arbitral decisions, may be a much too narrow view of how to as-
certain customary international law.
A. NAIETA CASE LAW PRIOR To THE FTC INTERPRETATION
Since NAPI'A became effective on January 1, 1994, several Chapter 11
tribunals have considered the scope of Article 1105 ("minimum standard
of treatment"). Although "[amn award made by a Tribunal shall have no
binding force except as between the disputing parties and in respect of a
particular case," prior decisions may have persuasive authority.33 Conse-
quently, it is important to examine NAFTA case law. An examination of
how NAY[A Chapter 11 arbitral tribunals have applied and interpreted
the precise scope of the concept of "fair and equitable treatment" and the
requirements of minimum standards of international law and "customary
international law" pursuant to the investment provisions of NAFTA in
S.D. Myers, Pope & Talbot, Mondev, and Glamis Gold, is particularly
helpful in understanding the United States' struggle to find a balance be-
tween providing robust foreign investment protections based on interna-
tional law and simultaneously avoid investment treaty disputes.
The issue is whether the definition of "customary international law" is
the same as the definition established in 1926 in Neer v. Mexico, where
the arbitral tribunal stated that "the treatment of an alien, in order to
constitute an international delinquency, should amount to an outrage, to
bad faith, to wil[l]ful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmen-
tal action so far short of international standards that every reasonable
and impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency."134 Has the
standard evolved? If yes, what evidence of custom is there to determine
31. See BARRY E. CARTIER, Pini-i-u R. Tizimun-, & CURTns A. BRADLP-]-Y, INTE-_RNA-
TIO0NAL_ LAW (4th ed. 2003) (1991).
32. James G. Apple, Independence of the Judiciary, IN'r'L JUD)ICIAL MONITOR, May
2006, www.judicialmonitor.org/archive-0506/generalprinciples.html.
33. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1136(1).
34. See Neer v. Mexico, 4 R Int'l Arb. Awards 60, 61-62 (1926).
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its current scope? In essence, are the hundreds of bilateral investment
treaties containing similar "fair and equitable treatment" language part of
an evolving body of "customary international law" and how egregious,
unreasonable or shocking must government conduct be before it reaches
the threshold of a violation of international law?
1. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada: "[Flair and equitable treatment"~ is
Subsumed in International Law Requirements
In S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, S.D. Myers, an Ohio company engaged
in remediation of hazardous waste, alleged that Canada's export ban of
polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) waste denied it fair and equitable treat-
ment under Article 1105 and was enacted to benefit Chem-Security, Ca-
nada's only PCB treatment facility located in Alberta, Canada.35 S.D.
Myers entered the Canadian market to obtain PCB wastes for treatment
in Ohio.36 S.D. Myers enjoyed a significant cost advantage over Chem-
Security: it was cheaper for Ontario PCB producers to ship their waste a
few hundred miles to Ohio rather than 1500 miles to Alberta.37 In 1995,
however, the Canadian Minister of the Environment issued interim and
final orders that temporarily banned PCB exports from Canada. 38 Cana-
dian companies had to treat their PCB wastes at Chem-Security. 39
Canada argued, however, that the ban was enacted in order to comply
with the Basel Convention, an international environmental agreement
developed under the auspices of the United Nations Environment
Programme. 40
The tribunal held that because the "[m]inimum [s]tandard of
[t]reatment" encompasses the international law requirements of due pro-
cess, economic rights, and obligations of good faith and natural justice, 41
Canada had violated Article 1105 through blatant discrimination with its
hazardous waste processing facility in Alberta and in S.D. Myers's similar
facility in Ohio. 42 The tribunal asserted that Article 1105(1)'s "fair and
equitable treatment," and "full protection and security" language must be
read in conjunction with the introductory phrase "treatment in accor-
dance with international law."143 Consequently, an Article 1105 breach
occurs only "when. .. .an investor has been treated in such an unjust or
arbitrary manner that the treatment rises to the level that is unacceptable
35. S.D. Myers, Inc., 40 I.L.M. at 1422.
36. Id. at 1415.
37. Id. at 1448.
38. Id. at 1419.
39. Id.
40. See id. The Basel Convention prohibits the export and import of hazardous waste
to and from states that are not party to the Agreement. At the time, the United
States had signed but not ratified the Convention. See The Basel Convention,
1992, available at http://www.basel.int/index.htmi.
41. See S.D. Myers, Inc., 40 I.L.M. at 1481.
42. See id. at 1448-50.
43. Id. at 1438.
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from the international perspective."144 Discriminatory and unfair treat-
ment is also a denial of good faith under Article 1105 as foreign investors
should not lack the protection and security afforded to nationals .45
Thus, it is clear that the S.D. Myers tribunal broadly interpreted the
"fair and equitable treatment" standards under Article 1105 in favor of
foreign investors: "fair and equitable treatment" is subsumed in the in-
ternational law standard and since international law includes rules de-
signed to protect investors, a denial of national treatment under Article
1102 can also be a violation of article 1105 .46
2. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada: "[Flair and equitable treatment" is
an Autonomous Standard That is not Limited to Customary
International Law
In Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada'47 a U.S. corporation alleged that Ca-
nada's enactment of an export quota system under the 1996 Softwood
Lumber Agreement with the United States discriminated against its Ca-
nadian subsidiary in violation of article 1105's "minimum standard of
treatment" clause. 4 8
Canada asserted, however, that according to international law, an arti-
cle 1105 minimum treatment standard violation required "egregious"
state conduct (the standard elucidated in Neer).49 Canada's enactment of
a lumber export control regime merely reallocated quotas among Al-
berta, British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec and reduced Pope & Tal-
bot's exports to the United States.50 Canada argued, therefore, that its
actions did not rise to the level of "egregious"~ conduct under interna-
tional law. 51
The arbitral tribunal held that Canada's Softwood Lumber Division of
the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade failed to pro-
vide Pope & Talbot's investment fair and equitable treatment.52 The tri-
bunal also held that the NAFTA right to "fair and equitable treatment"
was independent of, rather than limited by, the phrase "treatment in ac-
cordance with international law."153 In other words, the minimum stan-
dard of treatment's "fair and equitable treatment" component is an




47. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, Apr. 10, 2001,
available at http://www.i nternational.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-com-
merciaux/assets/pdfs/Award-Merits-e.pdf.
48. See id. at $1106.
49. Id. at 91 108.
50. Id. at 919120-21, 92-93, 121.
51. See id. at $$9 108-09.
52. Id. at 91 181.
53. Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, supra note 47, $91 i.
54. This approach (the autonomous standard) to identifying the content of the mini-
mum standard of treatment is generally preferred by arbitrators since it gives them
maximum discretion and rule-making authority. For example, an "autonomous"
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B. THE FTC INTERPRETATION AND ITS IMPAcT ON FUTURE
CHAPTER 11 TRIBUNALS
NAFI'A article 1131(2) permits the trade ministers from each party,
acting as the Free Trade Commission ("FTC"), to issue interpretations of
NAiFTA, which is binding on Chapter 11 tribunals.55 After the Pope &
Talbot tribunal held that Canada breached article 1105, the NAIFTA gov-
ernments issued their first, and to date, only NAiFTA Chapter 11 "inter-
pretation," to narrow the scope of "fair and equitable treatment" to what
customary international law provides.56 This interpretation of article
1105(1) states the following:
B. Minimum Standard of Treatment in Accordance with Interna-
tional Law
1. Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law mini-
mum standard of treatment to be afforded to investments of inves-
tors of another Party.
2. The concepts of "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protec-
tion and security" do not require treatment in addition to or beyond
that which is required by the customary international law minimum
standard of treatment of aliens.
3. A determination that there has been a breach of another provision
of the NAFTFA, or of a separate international agreement, does not
establish that there has been a breach of Article 1105(1).57
The "customary international law" standard under section B(1), as op-
posed to article 1105's "international law" language, substantially limits
Chapter 11 investment protection provisions. 58 Simply put, the interpre-
tation does not require that the concepts of "fair and equitable treat-
ment" and "full protection and security" be ignored, but rather that they
be subsumed in the minimum standard of treatment of aliens.
Section B(2) effectively overrules the then pending Pope & Talbot
award, clarifying that "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection
and security" are afforded only to the extent required by customary inter-
national law.59 Finally, in response to the S.D. Myers holding that Ca-
nada had violated the minimum standard of treatment provisions of
article 1105 through blatant discrimination between its hazardous waste
processing facility in Alberta and S.D. Myers' similar facility in Ohio,6 0
paragraph 3 prohibited a claimant from basing an article 1105 violation
interpretation of "fair and equitable treatment" would prohibit government action
that is arbitrary, even if not so egregious as to violate the Neer standard.
55. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1131(2).
56. NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of interpretation of Certain Chapter 11
Provisions § B (July 31, 2001), http://www.naftaclaims.com/files/NAFTA-Comm_
11 05 Transparency.pdf.
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. See Ad
59. See id.
60. S.D. Myers, Inc., 40 I.L.M. at 1438-39.
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largely on a finding of an article 1102 national treatment violation. 61
The FTFC Interpretation, however, immediately sparked controversy.
The Pope & Talbot tribunal even suggested that the parties' interpreta-
tion was actually a back-door effort to amend NAFI'A without the ap-
proval of each party's constitutional processes. 62 Indeed, the FTC had
effectively amended article 1105(1) by inserting the word "customary"
before "international law," thus, limiting the scope of article 1105 protec-
tions. The United States defended the interpretation and criticized the
Pope & Talbot tribunal arguing that treaty law and arbitral decisions were
not relevant in determining "customary international law" unless there
was evidence of a general practice, and agreement in the literature or
previous court cases.63 As noted previously, Canada urged the Pope &
Talbot tribunal to award damages pursuant to a violation of customary
international law only if the tribunal found Canada acted egregiously or
other-wise failed to meet internationally required standards (Neer).64
In the end, the Pope & Talbot tribunal held that the interpretation was
binding, but it refused to accept the static version of customary law ad-
vanced by Canada and the other parties. 65 Instead, the tribunal believed
that the range of actions subject to international concern included the
concept of fair and equitable treatment,66 which was recognized by the
OECD,67 and was central to the 1,800 BITs negotiated to protect foreign-
owned property.68 This clearly evidenced state practice towards the for-
mation of customary international law.69 The tribunal, nevertheless, did
not decide the applicable customary international law standard because
Canada's Softwood Lumber division violated article 1105 by treating
Pope & Talbot in an egregious manner.70
Several subsequent Chapter 11 tribunals have struggled with these
same issues. In fact, many have backed away from the idea that the inter-
pretation was an attempt not to interpret, but to indirectly amend,
NAKIA.
One final note regarding Pope & Talbot: the NAFTfA parties were
bothered by the tribunal's holding that the content of contemporary cus-
tomary international law reflects the concordant provisions of many hun-
dreds of BITs, particularly, the tribunal's failure to consider whether the
parties to very large numbers of BITs have acted out of a sense of legal
obligation (opinio juris) when they include "fair and equitable treatment"
provisions in those treaties, a necessary element of the establishment of a
rule of customary international law. The United States, in particular,
61. Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, supra note 56.
62. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 41 I.L.M. at $ 47.
63. Id. at s 112
64. Id. at s 108.
65. See id. at $$9 114-15.
66. Id. at 1109.
67. Id. at s1 112.
68. Id. at I9I 11.
69. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 41 I.L.M. at 111.
70. Id. at 91181.
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would continue to argue in subsequent disputes that evidence of state
practice alone is not enough to establish a rule of customary international
law.
1. Mondev v. United States: "[Clustomary International Law" Includes
Bilateral Investment Treaties Concluded Since NA ETA Came
into Force
In Mondev v. United States'7 1 the arbitral tribunal also examined
whether the content of customary international law providing for "fair
and equitable treatment" and full protection and security in investment
treaties was any different than it was in the 1920s. Mondev, a Canadian
real-estate development corporation, alleged that the Boston Redevelop-
ment Authority's statutory immunization from intentional tort liability is
incompatible with international law, and that the decisions of the Massa-
chusetts courts amounted to a denial of justice in violation of article
1105(l) .72
Like Pope & Talbot, Mondev argued that the interpretation was effec-
tively an amendment to NAFTA, permitted only with the applicable legal
procedures of each Party.73 Finally, Mondev argued that if customary
international law was the appropriate standard "that law had to be given
its current content, as it had been shaped by the conclusion of hundreds
of bilateral investment treaties, including NAFTA, and by modem inter-
national judgments and arbitral awards."174
While the United States recognized the significance of the jurispru-
dence of state practice and arbitral tribunals, it again contended that
BITs were not relevant in a customary international law analysis unless it
could be shown that they reflected evidence of a general practice, agree-
ment in the literature or previous court cases. A tribunal cannot "adopt
its own idiosyncratic standard of what is 'fair' or 'equitable,' without ref-
erence to established sources of law."175 Both Canada and Mexico argued
that although the customary international law standard could evolve over
time, the threshold for finding a violation of customary international law
required "arbitrary action substituted for the rule of law" for a
violation. 76
The arbitral tribunal held that the "substantive and procedural rights of
the individual in international law have undergone considerable develop-
ment, "[tlo the modern eye, what is unfair or inequitable need not equate
with the outrageous or egregious," and that "a State may treat foreign
investment unfairly and inequitably without necessarily acting in bad
faith."177 The tribunal reasoned that the interpretation's reference to
71. Mondev Int'l Ltd., 42 I.L.M. at 9 116.
72. See generally id.
73. Id. at s 102.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 119.
76. Id. at 108.
77. Id. at 116.
20101 395
396 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 16
"customary international law" meant that status of that body of law no
earlier than 1994, when the NAIFTA came into force.78 This includes
"'more than two thousand bilateral investment treaties and many treaties
of friendship and commerce" that "provide for 'fair and equitable' treat-
ment of, and for 'full protection and security' for, the foreign investor and
his investments."17 9 The tribunal felt the question was not to show opinic
juris or to amass sufficient evidence demonstrating it, but rather, what is
the content of customary international law providing for "fair and equita-
ble treatment" and full protection and security in investment treaties.
2. Glamis Gold v. United States: Threshold for a Violation of
International Law in the "Fair and Equitable Treatment"
Area is the Neer Case
More recently, an arbitral tribunal constituted under Chapter 11 of
NAFTA, resolved a protracted dispute between the United States and
Glamis Gold Ltd. (Glamis Gold v. United States).80 As noted below,
Glamis Gold is a new interpretation of customary international law (at
least because it represents a departure from what other Chapter 11 arbi-
tral tribunals have said about the minimum standard of treatment) that,
to the dismay of investment arbitrators and private sector investment
lawyers, further narrows the scope of "fair and equitable treatment."
Glamis, a Canadian mining company, alleged that certain U.S. federal
government actions and California state measures with respect to open-
pit mining (including regulations requiring backfilling and grading opera-
tions in the vicinity of Native American sacred sites) resulted in an Arti-
cle 1105 fair and equitable treatment violation.81 The Tribunal noted that
"[tihere is no disagreement among the State Parties to the NAFTFA, nor
the Parties to this [case], that the requirement of fair and equitable treat-
ment in Article 1105 is to be understood by reference to the customary
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens."182 Accord-
ingly, the tribunal characterized the Article 1105 issue before it as one
requiring a determination of the precise scope of "fair and equitable
treatment" and the requirements of minimum standards of customary in-
ternational law owed by a NAFTA State Party to an investor of another
State Party.83
Glamis argued "that the duty to accord investors fair and equitable
treatment and the minimum standard of treatment are dynamic standards
informed by the proliferation of more than 2,000 bilateral investment
treaties and many treaties of friendship and commerce." 84 Consequently,
78. Id. at 125.
79. Mondev Int'l Ltd., 42 l.L.M. at 1I 125.
80. See Glamnis Gold Ltd., v. United States, Award, May 16, 2009, available at http://
www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Glamis/Glamis-USA-Award.pdf.
81. Id. at 537.
82. Id. at 599.
83. Id. at 91600.
84. Id. at $1 548.
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the tribunal could consider prior arbitral decisions to establish that the
threshold for a violation of "fair and equitable treatment" is "something
less than the 'egregious,' 'outrageous,' or 'shocking' standard as eluci-
dated in Neer."185
The United States, however, attacked Glamis' use of treaties and prior
interpretations of "fair and equitable treatment" by arbitral tribunals.
Arbitral awards, the United States argued, do not constitute State prac-
tice and cannot prove customary international law. 86 Thus, parties to bi-
lateral investment treaties are not legally obligated to include "fair and
equitable treatment" provisions in those treaties.
Ultimately, the tribunal accepted the view of the NAFTA parties that
the threshold for a violation of international law in the "fair and equita-
ble treatment" area is the Neer case. The tribunal explained that to de-
termine the scope of customary international law, one must consider not
only questions of law but also questions of fact. "[C]ustom is found in the
practice of States regarded as legally required by them."187 The tribunal
held that although State practice may be readily identifiable, the intent
behind those actions is not.818 Consequently, custom is effectively frozen
at the 1926 conception of egregious. 89
C. CHAPTER 10 OF THE UNITED STATES' ETAs WITH PERU,
COLOMBIA AND PANAMA
The United States, Peru, Colombia and Panama structured Article
10.5(1) to ensure the applicability of "customary international law,"
rather than "international law" in their respective agreements. Each re-
quires that the parties "accord to covered investments treatment in accor-
dance with customary international law, including fair and equitable
treatment and full protection and security."90 Similarly, the parties clari-
fied that "customary international law" as referenced in Article 10.5 "re-
sults from a general and consistent practice of States that they follow
from a sense of legal obligation." 9' The inclusion of a definition of cus-
tomary international law may reflect the United States' apparent frustra-
tion with the Pope & Talbot tribunal's failure to consider whether the
parties to numerous BITs have acted out of a sense of legal obligation
when they include provisions for "fair and equitable treatment" of for-
eign investment in those treaties.
The impact of these provisions is unclear, however, since neither agree-
ment addresses the current scope of customary international law. In ad-
dition, there have been no investment disputes in post-NAFFrA FTAs that
have reached the stage of investor-state arbitration. Consequently, future
85. Id.
86. Glamis Gold Ltd., at 554.
87. Id at 21.
88. Id. at 91603.
89. Id at j1 604.
90. See Peru, Colombia and Panama FTAs, supra note 2, art. 10.5(l).
91. Id. at Annex 10-A.
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Chapter 10 arbitral tribunals will be required to determine what this cus-
tomary international law standard of treatment found in the Peru, Co-
lombia and Panama FTAs requires of a State Party vis-A-vis investors of
another State Party.
More likely than not, they will look to NAFTA jurisprudence to see
how NAFI'A Chapter 11 arbitral tribunals have interpreted the precise
scope of the concept of "fair and equitable treatment" and the require-
ments of minimum standards of customary international law. Several
Chapter 11 arbitral tribunals have determined that the hundreds of bilat-
eral investment treaties containing similar "fair and equitable treatment"
language evidence an evolving body of customary international law. Nev-
ertheless, the Glamis Gold tribunal accepted the view of the NAFTA par-
ties that the threshold for a violation of international law in the "fair and
equitable treatment" area is the 1926 Neer case with no development
since then.92 This interpretative approach further narrows the scope of
"fair and equitable treatment."
111. TRADE ACT OF 2002
United States concerns about NAFTA Chapter 11 investor-state arbi-
tration mostly pertain to legitimate government regulatory actions (many
that are designed to protect the environment) and measures that would
not be compensable under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, but would give rise to liability under international investment trea-
ties;93 NAFTrA tribunal review of national court decisions; and the
possibility that foreign citizens bringing NAFTA investment claims may
have greater rights than American citizens facing the same governmental
action would have pursuant to the Fifth Amendment or a specific statute
authorizing court action.94
Particularly relevant are Methanex v. United States95 and Loewen v.
United States,96 two post-interpretation Chapter 11 actions against the
United States, which ultimately led to the negotiating objectives for fu-
ture investment provisions in international trade agreements and bilateral
investment treaties as embodied in the 2002 U.S. "Trade Promotion
Authority."197
92. Glamis Gold Ltd, at 612.
93. DAxVH3 A. GANTz, REGIONAL- TRAri) AGREFMENrs: LAW, Poi .ICY AND: PRAuCIC
123 (2009). The Takings Clause of the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
states that, "[Nior shall private property be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation." U.S. CONs-r. art. V. The controlling U.S. case is Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v. New York City, which requires a fact-based inquiry of every
alleged taking, considering, inter alia, the economic impact of the government ac-
tion, the extent to which it interferes with reasonable investor expectations, and
the character of the government action. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
94. Id.
95. Methanex Corp. v. United States. 44 I.L.M. 1345 (2005).
96. Loewen Group, Inc., 42 l.L.M. at $ 28.
97. Trade Promotion Authority (fast track) provides that U.S. Congress must, gener-
ally speaking, vote trade agreements up or down in their entirety.
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A. METHANEX V. UNITED STATES: PROHIBITION OR RESTRICTED
USE OF CHEMICAL COMPOUNDS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
AND/OR HEALTH REASONS IS PERMISSIBLE
In Methanex v. United States,98 Methanex, a Canadian producer and
marketer of methanol, alleged that California's ban of the gasoline addi-
tive, methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE), because of the perceived risks
of MTBE pollution of the underground water supply, constituted "unfair
and inequitable treatment" and was "tantamount to expropriation."
Methanex argued "the California measures were intended to discriminate
against foreign investors and their investments, and intentional discrimi-
nation is, by definition, unfair and inequitable. "99
Methanex asserted that the FTFC Interpretation binds the parties if and
only if it is not an amendment of Article 1105(l).100 Methanex recog-
nized the FTC's ability to issue binding interpretations of NAFTA provi-
sions but asserted that it lacks the power to amend NAFTFA.
Consequently, any interpretation limiting the scope, of investment protec-
tion, including the interpretation suggested by the United States, would
be an impermissible amendment. 10' Methanex argued, therefore, that the
tribunal must interpret Article 1105's fair and equitable treatment provi-
sion in accordance with its ordinary meaning.' 02
In support of its proposition, Methanex cited rules of treaty interpreta-
tion, NAITA jurisprudence, international law, and domestic law. First,
Methanex asserted that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
required the tribunal to interpret Chapter 11 in light of its purpose, which
is to provide investment protection. Therefore, the words fair and equita-
ble treatment should be interpreted by their plain meaning. 103 Second,
Methanex contended that the Loewen tribunal had previously ruled that
Chapter 11 should be given a liberal interpretation in order to provide
investment protection 104
Third, Methanex rejected the United States' argument that the defini-
tion of fair and equitable treatment is too "unknown" or "subjective" to
be given its ordinary meaning. Methanex asserted that the definition of
fair and equitable treatment is well-known in both international and do-
mestic law. 105 "While the fair and equitable treatment standard may not
98. Methanex v. United States, 1st Partial Award, Aug. 7, 2002, available at http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/1 261 3.pdf.
99. Id. at T 11.
100. Methanex Corp. v. United States, Claimant Methanex Corp., Reply to the Resp. of
Resp't, United States of America, Oct. 26, 2001, to Methanex's Submission Con-
cerning the NAFTA Free Trade Comm'n's July 31. 2001 Interpretation, at 2, Nov.
9, 2001, available at http:// www.naftaclaims.com [hereinafter Methanex Reply
Submission].
101. Id.
102. Id. at 3.
103. Id. at 4.
104. Id.
105. Methanex Corp. v. United States, Methanex First Submission Concerning the
NAFTA FTC Statement on Article 1105, at 19, Sept. 18, 2001, available at http://
www.state.gov/s/l/c5823.htm.
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be reducible to a single formulation applicable to every set of circum-
stances, the standard is routinely applied by international and U.S. judges
in a variety of different contexts. There is no reason why this Tribunal
cannot apply the same standard to the California measures." 106 Finally,
Methanex argued that the text of NAFTA must be given its ordinary
meaning: "international law" under Article 1105 must be read expan-
sively to include both customary and treaty law.107
The United States, however, asserted that the interpretation negated
Methanex's arguments based on Article 1105(l);108 the scope of "custom-
ary international law" as defined in the interpretation was consistent with
"thirty years of State practice." 109 The United States also argued that
"fair and equitable treatment" did not encompass broad "concepts of 'eq-
uity, fairness, due process and appropriate protections.'" "10 Finally, the
United States argued that Article 1105 did not permit "claims based on
violations of WTO or other conventional international obligations."'
The tribunal rejected all of Methanex's Chapter 11 substantive claims,
including those based on Article 1105(1). The tribunal applied the FTC
Interpretation's restrictive "fair and equitable treatment" standard and
held that the United States did not violate Article 1105.112 Although ear-
lier cases indicated an increasingly expansive view of NAFTA's invest-
ment protection provisions, the interpretation directs Chapter 11 arbitral
tribunals to narrow the scope of "fair and equitable treatment" to what
customary international law provides. 13 Even if the FTC Interpretation
was a substantive change, "[a] treaty may be amended by agreement be-
tween the parties,""14 and "any subsequent agreement between the par-
ties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its
provisions"~ shall be taken into account.'"5
The tribunal also held that California's ban was a permissible regula-
tion-a non-discriminatory action, for a public purpose, in accordance
with due process of law, and fair and equitable treatment-and not an
expropriation." 6 Methanex entered the US market aware that govern-
ment environmental and health protection institutions "continuously
106. Id. at 5.
107. Id.
108. Methanex Corp. v. United States, Resp. of Resp't, United States of America, to
Methanex's Submission Concerning the NAFTA Free Trade Comm'n's July 31.
2001 Interpretation, at 1, Oct. 26, 2001, available at http:// www.state.gov/docu-
men ts/organization/6028.pdf.
109. Id. at 4.
110. Id. at 6.
111. Id. at 7-8.
112. Methanex v. United States, Final Award on Jurisdiction and Merits at Part IV,
Chapter C, at J1 27, Aug. 3, 2005, available at http://www.state.gov/s/1/c5818.htm.
113. Id. at is9 9-10. Discrimination between nationals and aliens contravenes custom-
ary international law only by way of exception-Methanex failed to establish that
a specific customary rule required equal treatment under the circumstances.
114. Id. at 91 21.
115. Id.
116. Id. Part IV, Chapter D, at 9 9-10.
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monitored the use and impact of chemical compounds and commonly
prohibited or restricted the use of some of those compounds for environ-
mental and/or health reasons.""17
B. LOB WEN V. UNITED STATES: NAFTA TRIBUNAL REVIEW OF
NATIONAL COURT DECISIONS Is NOT PERMISSIBLE UNLESS
LOCAL LEGAL REMEDIES ARE EXHAUSTED
In Loewen v. United States, a Mississippi state court trial alleged to
have been conducted in an intentionally prejudicial manner resulted in a
jury verdict of $500 million against Loewen (a Canadian operator of fu-
neral homes), of which $400 million represented punitive damages, even
though the disputed contracts were worth less than $10 million."18
Loewen subsequently brought a NAFTA Chapter 11 claim against the
United States arguing that Article 1105(1) and the interpretation pre-
scribe the customary international law standard of treatment of aliens as
the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to the investment
property of nationals of the other party."19 The introduction of anti-Ca-
nadian testimony and counsel comments during the trial was prejudicial
and violated the "fair and equitable treatment" standard.' 20 Loewen ar-
gued, "[u]nder international law, an alien is entitled to an impartial trial
untainted by invidious discrimination.1 12 1
In response, the United States argued, inter alia, that the treatment ac-
corded to Loewen by the Mississippi state courts could not be shown to
be "below the international minimum standard required by Article
1105.11I22 The fact that "the Tribunal must consider the entirety of the
United States' system of justice stems from the nature of the customary
international law obligation that gives rise to State responsibility for de-
nial of justice."'123 The United States ultimately prevailed.
The Tribunal agreed that the Mississippi court decision was "clearly
improper and discreditable and cannot be squared with minimum stan-
dards of international law and fair and equitable treatment."'124 Yet, the
tribunal added: "[n~o instance has been drawn to our attention in which
an international tribunal has held a State responsible for a breach of in-
ternational law constituted by a lower court decision when there was
available an effective and adequate appeal within the State's legal sys-
117. Id.
118. See generally Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Notice of Claim, Oct. 30, 1998,
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/3922.pdf.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 7.
121. Id. at 141.
122. Loewen Group, Inc. & Raymond L. Lowen v. United States, Counter-Memorial of
the United States, ICSID Case No. ARB (A-F)/9813, 142 (2003), available at http:/I
www.state.gov/documents/organization/7387.pdf.
123. Id.
124. Loewen Group, Inc. & Raymond L. Lowen & United States, Award, ICSID Case
No. ARB (AF)198/3, $ 137 (2003), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/or-
ganization/22094.pdf.
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tern." 125 In other words, a NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunal cannot find a
violation of international law unless local legal remedies have been ex-
hausted (the finality requirement via exhaustion of domestic judicial
remedies).' 26
Notwithstanding the fact that NAFTA has an election (a foreign inves-
tor must waive his right to "initiate or continue" domestic court proceed-
ings prior to initiating NAFTA arbitration), not an exhaustion
requirement, 27 the NAiFTA parties must have been relieved by the
Loewen tribunal's holding because NAFFA negotiators probably never
intended for domestic courts to be subject to NAFI'A actionable
claims,' 2 8 which would effectively subject domestic judicial decisions to
review by international tribunals, notwithstanding the possible absence or
inadequacy of domestic judicial remedies. Indeed, many Americans
would likely find this troubling. Allowing foreign investors to challenge
judicial decisions under Chapter 11 would give foreign investors greater
rights than domestic investors, whose only recourse is the domestic legal
system.' 29
The Methanex and Loewen cases ultimately led to the negotiating
objectives for future investment provisions in international trade agree-
ments and bilateral investment treaties as embodied in the 2002 U.S.
"Trade Promotion Authority," which states:
[T]he principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding
foreign investment are to reduce or eliminate artificial or trade-dis-
torting barriers to foreign investment, while ensuring that foreign in-
vestors in the United States are not accorded greater substantive rights
with respect to investment protections than United States investors in
125. Id. at s9154.
126. The tribunal incorrectly held that under the exhaustion requirement, Loewen was
required to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court before the NAFT'A arbitral panel
had jurisdiction. A foreign investor must only waive his right to "initiate or con-
tinue" domestic court proceedings prior to initiating NAFTA arbitration. Loewen
Group, Inc., 42 I.L.M. at 9 145.
127. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1121. Beginning with the Singapore and Chile
FTAs, the United States has included an election requirement compared to
NAFTA Chapter 11's waiver approach in subsequent FTFAs, which significantly
narrows an investor's options. Chile FTA Article 10.17, for example, requires a
claimant's written waiver of any right to initiate or continue suit against the party
in any other court or under any other dispute resolution procedure. See Free
Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile art. 10.1 7(2), June 6, 2003, Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/
chile-ftalfinal-text (last visited Sept. 22, 2009) [hereinafter Chile FTA]. Conse-
quently, an American investor in Chile may not seek arbitration under Chapter 10
if she has already alleged the breach of Section A or Annex 10-F in a national
court or administrative tribunal. Id. Except for interim injunctive relief, once an
action is filed in the national courts, etc., no waiver is possible (the investor may
seek interim injunctive relief from a domestic court, provided that the action is
brought for the sole purpose of preserving the investor's investment pending the
arbitration, rather than monetary damages). Id. art. 10.17(3).
128. Stefan Matiation, Arbitration with Two Twists: Loewen v. United States and Free
Trade Commission Intervention in NAFTA Chapter 11 Disputes, 24 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 451, 468 (2003).
129. Id. at 461.
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the United States, and to secure for investors important rights compa-
rable to those that would be available under United States legal prin-
ciples and practice, by . . .reducing or eliminating exceptions to the
principle of national treatment . . .seeking to establish standards for
expropriation and compensation for expropriation, consistent with
United States legal principles and practice ... seeking to establish stan-
dards for fair and equitable treatment consistent with United States
legal principles and practice, including the principle of due
process .. 130
By explicitly limiting protection for foreign investors in the United
States to the rights guaranteed to U.S. citizens, the United States appears
to be abandoning the application of minimum standards of international
law and the availability of international arbitration for its own version of
national treatment in the case of takings. This is eerily similar to the
Calvo Doctrine discussed infra. Still, the U.S.-Chile FTA for example,
which was designed in significant part to comply with the TPA objectives,
solidified the applicability of international law to foreign investment dis-
putes (the U.S. FTAs with Peru, Colombia and Panama have similar
provisions).' 3'
Compared to NAITA Article 1105, Chile K[FA Article 10.4 provides
more detail with respect to the standards of treatment of aliens and their
property found in customary international law. 132 Indeed, Chile FA Ar-
ticle 10.4(2) avoids reducing "fair and equitable treatment" to no more
than non-discriminatory treatment, where national treatment does not
meet minimum standards of customary international law.' 33 A "mini-
mum standard" provision is necessary to avoid harsh, injurious, and un-
just treatment to foreign investors, even if a government did not act in a
discriminatory manner.' 34 Article 10.4(2) also equates fair and equitable
treatment under customary international law with U.S. standards of due
process, so the former is not broader than the latter.' 35 The due process
language advocates the United States' position in Loewen (customary in-
ternational law does not require the United States to provide a perfect
justice system only one that is "fundamentally adequate").
Although Chile F17A Article 10.9 addresses the concerns expressed by
governments and environmental groups regarding the distinction be-
tween compensable expropriation and valid regulation, 36 the Chile F[A
provisions with the most significant changes related to expropriation ap-
pear in Annex 10-D. Annex 10-D provides that Article 10.9 not go be-
yond customary international law for investment protection and limits
expropriation claims to interference with tangible or intangible property
130. Trade Act of 2002. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b) (emphasis added).
131. U.S. FTAs available at h ttp://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agree-
ments (last visited Aug. 10, 2010).
132. See Chile FTA, supra note 127, art. 10.4.
133. Id art. 10.4(2).
134. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 41 I.L.M. at 1 10.
135. Loewen Group, Inc., 42 I.L.M. at 144.
136. See Chile FTA, supra note 127, art. 10.9.
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rights.' 37
Annex 10-1)(4) also stresses the need for the "equivalency" of indirect
takings to direct takings, absent only the formal transfer of title or out-
right seizure.' 38 Accordingly, a case-by-case approach is necessary to de-
termine whether government interference is reasonable. Factors to
consider include the economic impact of the government action. Even
though an action by a party has an adverse effect on the economic value
of an investment, this effect by itself does not establish that an indirect
expropriation has occurred. 139 "[Tihe extent to which the government
action interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions"' 40 and "the character of the government action" 14' is also
considered.
Finally, Chile FT'A Annex 10-D states that non-discriminatory actions
protecting "legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health,
safety, and the environment" are not actionable expropriations "except in
rare circumstances."114 2 Consider the Methanex case; California's MTBE
ban would not be an actionable expropriation, because it is a non-dis-
criminatory action, for a public purpose, in accordance with due process
of law, and fair and equitable treatment.
V. THE BIPARTISAN TRADE DEAL OF 2007
As previously noted, the changes incorporated into the investment pro-
visions of U.S. FTAs subsequent to NAFTA, as required by the Presi-
dent's now expired Trade Promotion Authority (TPA expired June 30,
2007),143 largely reflect experience in litigation between Canada and the
United States. In addition, there have been no investment disputes in
post-NAFTFA FTFAs that have reached the stage of investor-state arbitra-
tion.' 44 Nevertheless, Congress apparently remained concerned that for-
eign investors bringing actions against the United States will receive
better legal treatment than U.S. national investors bringing similar claims
(U.S. investors do not have recourse to international arbitration against
the United States Government or its agencies although they have full ac-
cess to the U.S. courts). Accordingly, in May 2007, U.S. Trade Represen-
tative Susan Schwab and the Democratic Congressional leadership
137. See id. Annex 10-D(4).
138. Id.
139. Id. at Annex 10-D(4)(a)(i).
140. Id. at Annex 1O-D(4)(a)(ii).
141. Id. at Annex 1-D(4)(a)(iii).
142. Id. at Annex 10-D(4)(b).
143. Lee Hudson Teslik, Fast-Track Trade Promotion Authority and Its Impact on U.S.
Trade Policy, Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, COUNCIL ON FORI-IC'N
RiELATIONS, June 25, 2007, http://www.cfr.org/publication/13663/.
144. As of March 2008, however, arbitrators were being chosen for a dispute between a
U.S. firm, Railroad Development Corp. and the Government of Guatemala. See
Rosella Brevetti, Arbitration Panel in First CAFTA-DR Investor-State Case Awaits
Arbitrator, 25 Int'l Trade Rep. (13NA) 350, Mar. 3, 2008.
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negotiated the Bipartisan Trade Deal. 14 5
While the May 2007 BTD did not change the now-standard investment
protection language found in U.S. FTAs, beginning with the Singapore
and Chile FTAs, the preamble to the U.S. FTAs with Peru, Colombia and
Panama has been changed to explicitly provide that foreign investors will
not be accorded greater substantive rights regarding investment protec-
tions than U.S. investors in the United States. Under the new preambu-
lar language the Parties:
AGREE that foreign investors are not hereby accorded greater sub-
stantive rights with respect to investment protections than domestic
investors under domestic law where, as in the United States, protec-
tions of investor rights under domestic law equal or exceed those set
forth in this Agreement . 4
The BTD limits the applicability of domestic law to situations, explic-
itly including those in the United States, where protection of investor
rights are allegedly equal to or greater than those set out in the Agree-
ment (those provided by customary international law and the explicit
rights under Section A of the investment chapter) .1' 7 The issue is
whether under U.S. law foreign investors possess all the legal rights guar-
anteed by international law as U.S. domestic investors under the U.S.
Constitution. If yes, this clause has no substantive impact. In blatant
cases of uncompensated expropriation such as have occurred recently in
Argentina and Venezuela (Argentina's nationalization of Aerolfneas Ar-
gentinas and Venezuela's taking of Exxon's production licenses for exam-
ple), an arbitral tribunal could probably dismiss the argument that
protections under local law were at least equal to those provided under
the investment chapter of the Agreement. 14 8 More interesting, however,
would be if and when FTFA member governments defending against for-
eign investors assert that their local law also meets or exceeds the re-
quirements of the particular FTA's investment chapter. In an alleged
regulatory takings case arbitrators could presumably ask the parties to
the investment dispute to brief and argue the intricacies of U.S. expropri-
ation law in the arbitration proceeding. 149
In addition, the preambular language, like the national treatment lan-
guage found in the 2002 Trade Deal, is also reminiscent of the Calvo Doc-
trine (named after the Argentinean diplomat Carlos Calvo), which, as
discussed infra, Latin American jurisdictions traditionally embraced, es-
pousing nonintervention in Latin American affairs and absolute equality
of foreigners and Latin American nationals by providing that foreigners
could only seek redress for grievances before local courts.' 50
145. See Trade Facts: Final Bipartisan Trade Deal on Investment, supra note 13.
146. See Peru, Colombia and Panama FfAs, supra note 2, at Preamble.
147. See GANTZ, supra note 93, at 101-02.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Bernardo M. Cremades, Disputes Arising Out of Foreign Direct In vestment in
Latin America: A New Look at the Calvo Doctrine and Other Jurisdictional Issues,
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VI. AMERICANIZATION OF THE CALVO DOCTRINE
A lot has been made of Latin America's traditional hostility towards
international arbitration embodied in the Calvo Doctrine. Although the
region has engaged in extensive bilateral commitments to encourage for-
eign direct investment in their countries, economic instability and popu-
list politics have again had unexpected consequences for the rights of
foreign investors to arbitrate investment disputes. Several South Ameri-
can states, including Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Argentina
are withdrawing from ICSID or simply ignoring the terms of the bilateral
investment treaties made with their trading partners. The Calvo Doctrine
and intimations are reawakening.' 5'
Although the United States has historically rejected the Calvo Doc-
trine, in an ironic change of policy it now appears to be implementing
what all Latin American states would recognize as the Calvo Doctrine in
an effort to limit its exposure to investment treaty claims.' 52 Indeed, gov-
ernments in South and North America are now similarly reluctant to be
bound by international standards.' 53
In the Trade Act of 2002, Congress mandated a treaty-negotiating ob-
jective "that foreign investors in the United States are not accorded
greater substantive rights with respect to investment protections than
United States investors in the United States."115 4 This national treatment
is a central feature of the Calvo Doctrine. And while the 2004 version of
the U.S. Model BIT still requires treatment in accordance with customary
international law, the State Department's explanation indicates that the
59 DisP. RE-soi. J. 78, 80 (2004). "The Calvo Doctrine gave rise to the Calvo
clause, which precluded arbitration and instead required disputes to be resolved in
national courts. Latin American countries and State-owned companies included a
Calvo clause in their investment contracts and agreements with foreign investors."
Id.
151. See Andrew P. Tuck, Investor-State Arbitration Revised: A Critical Analysis of the
Revisions and Proposed Reforms to the ICSID and UNCITRA L Arbitration Rules,
13 LAW & Bus. REV. Am. 885, 905-06 (2007) (discussing the threat of non-enforce-
ment of ICSID arbitral awards in Latin America).
152. Ironic, for example, because Mexico's experience with the Calvo Clause was espe-
cially problematic to the NAFTA negotiations of investment provisions. Indeed,
Mexico was one of the Latin American countries that most adamantly adhered to
the Calvo Clause and the principle of the Calvo Doctrine. If a party (Canada or
the United States) could not take up the cause of one of its citizens with an invest-
ment in Mexico, who was aggrieved at the action of the Mexican government,
party-to-party dispute resolution would be impossible. Accordingly, Mexico
agreed to change its view, and adopted a new arbitration regime based upon the
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. See Ernesto
Aguirre, International Economic Integration and Trade in Financial Services: Anal-
ysis from a Latin American Perspective, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1057, 1063
(1996). See also Denise Manning-Cabrol, The Imminent Death of the Calvo Clause
and the Rebirth of the Calvo Principle: Equality of Foreign and National Investors,
26 LAW & PoijY INT't Bus. 1179 (1995). NAFTA still represents the first and only
time Mexico has entered into an international agreement providing for investor-
state arbitration.
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international minimum standard of treatment is expected and nothing
more.155 Finally, the preambular language found in the Peru, Colombia
and Panama FTAs also provides for national treatment: "foreign inves-
tors are not hereby accorded greater substantive rights with respect to
investment protections than domestic investors under domestic law
where, as in the United States, protections of investor rights under do-
mestic law equal or exceed those set forth in this Agreement." 156 Still,
while the preambular language in recent FTAs incorporates Calvo Doc-
trine elements, it's important to remember that the other element of the
Calvo Doctrine, resolution of disputes solely in the tribunals of the host
country, has not been seriously advocated in the United States.
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States' well-developed legal system and independent judi-
ciary provide a high level of investment protection for both foreign and
domestic investors against arbitrary government action. In 2008, despite
the turbulence in financial markets that originated in the United States
and led to the sharpest downturn of its economy in decades, the United
States remained the largest FDI recipient worldwide. 157 Consequently,
the United States will be a defendant in more investment treaty disputes,
especially NAIFTA Chapter 11 investor-state disputes, causing it to con-
tinually struggle to balance robust investment protections based on inter-
national law and simultaneously avoid investment treaty disputes.
Future NAFTA investment litigation, and to a lesser extent, potential
investment disputes in post-NAFTA free trade agreements, including the
FTFAs with Peru, Colombia and Panama, will likely help shape U.S. policy
regarding foreign investment law in the future much like the changes in-
corporated into the investment provisions of U.S. FTFAs subsequent to
NAFTA largely reflect experience in litigation between Canada and the
United States. But there is a strong likelihood that investment protec-
tions will continue to regress.
How much more the United States will limit investment protection
provisions is unclear. The U.S. Trade Representative and the State De-
partment have begun to consider modifications to the 2004 U.S. Model
BIT. The State Department recently released a report that reflects the
lack of a consensus in the United States regarding the appropriateness of
investor-state arbitration of BIT claims.158 Critics expressed strong con-
cerns about the potential for investor-state arbitration claims to under-
mine public-spirited policies, and to detract from the vitality of domestic
judicial institutions.
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In addition, some sub-committee members suggested that home and
host governments be given wider latitude to jointly screen or filter some
investor claims on the grounds that they might cause serious public harm
(such filtering is currently permitted under the 2004 U.S. Model BIT).' 59
This "self-judging" exception, however, has been the subject of a lot of
scrutiny following Argentina's financial crisis earlier this decade and the
government's 2002 emergency monetary policy that froze local tariffs and
abolished U.S. dollar-to-Peso convertibility. Argentina was subsequently
named as a respondent in dozens of ICSID arbitrations and actively
sought to suspend the arbitrations claiming that the monetary measures
were necessary to maintain Argentina's "essential security."'160 Govern-
ments should probably not apply the "essential security" exception
against foreign investors for "predominantly economic objectives."
Others also questioned the extent to which protections such as "fair
and equitable treatment" for foreign investors should be tied expressly to
the minimum standard of treatment under customary international law
rather than some more expansive treaty-specific obligations.' 6 ' Whereas
the 2004 U.S. Model BIT grounds key protections to customary interna-
tional law, critics urged that customary international law standards be de-
fined more clearly in order to provide greater certainty and to clarify that
customary international law prescribes very narrow demands.' 62 By con-
trast, however, other committee members called for a return to the lan-
guage used in the 1994 U.S. Model BIT, which provided broader
protection for investors since it was not bound to customary international
law standards.163 Consequently, several years may pass by before the
United States actually modifies the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, and that model
may not be much better for U.S. investors abroad than nothing at all.
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